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 North Korea is notable for its isolation, yet the Korean Central News Agency’s daily 
editions are filled with articles outlining international admiration for Pyongyang and its leader. 
Is Pyongyang actively promoting soft power as an integral part of not only its survival, but its 
development strategy? While scholarship on North Korea tends to focus on Pyongyang’s “high 
profile” relations with China or Russia (Shambaugh 2003, McCormack 2004, Wu 2005) or 
with nations seeking to cooperate on weapons of mass destruction (Henriksen 2001), little 
attention has been paid to how the DPRK engages in seemingly peaceful ways with the world. 
This article examines the notion of hard, soft, smart and other power declensions, and applies 
a soft-power framework to investigate DPRK rhetoric and the development of partnerships 
with both states and non-state actors. It suggests that the DPRK has long pursued a strategy of 
diplomatic diversification, which includes a more sophisticated understanding of power than 
previously considered in the literature.  
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 From its inception on 15 August 1948, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(DPRK) has been engaged in a war of survival. The North Korean struggle to exist is political 
and has centered for many years on the question of which Korea was the more legitimate entity 
to manage the entire peninsula. So, the Koreas competed politically, attracting international 
support and playing off one another until they each became equals as members of the United 
Nations in 1991. Yet, they still square off over an unresolved armistice and a Demilitarized 
Zone cutting the peninsula in half. The North Korean struggle to exist is also ideological, with 
a ruling system inspired by Marxist-Leninist approaches and a spirit of self-reliance and 
independence, as embodied in the ever-encompassing Chuch’e principles. Clinging to 
Communist ideas after the Soviet Union collapse has alienated the DPRK, marginalizing it to 
the periphery of the international system. The North Korean struggle to exist is, intrinsically, 
about its system and its basic economic model, which has suffered from estrangement as old 
trading partners vanished or joined new trading blocks. It has also suffered from a domestic 
political crisis with the construction of a cult of personality surrounding Kim Il Sung, and the 
imperatives needed to sustain loyalty upon his death, and the death of his son Kim Jong Il. 
Finally, the DPRK’s existence has suffered because of input and output mismanagement, 
inclement weather, and international sanctions. This has now created a catch-22 situation: 
Pyongyang’s desire and perceived needs to ensure its survival has led to its military buildup 
and the development of what it claims is a defensive nuclear weapons program. As a result, the 
international community has sanctioned and isolated the country. With trading partners slowly 
disengaging from existing deals, and few opportunities to exchange funds via the international 
banking system, North Korea appears relatively powerless in our globalized world, yet still 
manages to, as Marcus Noland had already suggested 20 years ago, “muddle through” (1997, 
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117). This does not mean that the DPRK has been completely isolated and impervious to the 
international system, however. While a large part of the scholarship on the DPRK focuses on 
military might, nuclear weapons programs and the security dilemma, a growing number of 
studies consider a more critical approach and question the foundations of our understanding of 
how the DPRK operates. This means that questions of power and energy are no longer treated 
from the standpoint of the United States and its own security needs. Instead, many scholars 
support the thesis that the DPRK is a rational actor and that it is possible to analyze the DPRK 
using a number of International Relations lenses. Hence, this article considers the question of 
soft power and its articulation, and applies it to the DPRK to further our understanding of how 
Pyongyang functions and how one might tackle the question of North Korean survival. 
Essentially, the article questions the assumption that soft power appears to be a relatively 
inefficient approach to defusing tensions and crisis on the peninsula.  
 Our argument is that the notion of soft power has often bypassed the DPRK, and has 
only considered how soft power has been applied to the DPRK, and not how the DPRK itself 
has used soft power. The suggestion here is that soft power waged onto the DPRK has had to 
contend with Pyongyang’s own strategic narrative and its own attempts to project soft power. 
In order to present these findings, the article proceeds in three steps. First, it considers a classic 
understanding of power and how soft power has slowly been accepted as a different kind of 
power, one that utilizes public diplomacy to complement hard power usually based on military 
might. Second, the article presents a more refined understanding of soft power, one that 
highlights three directions that particularly pertain to the DPRK’s situation: (1) the concept of 
defensive soft power, (2) the idea of improving one’s image via virtual enlargement and (3) 
the hope to develop a niche diplomacy that will allow for growth. Third, the article considers 
the DPRK’s situation by focusing on the classic “soft power in the DPRK context” narrative 
that sees Pyongyang only as a target of soft power, before analyzing how the DPRK has utilized 
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soft power itself in a defensive manner, to manage its image abroad and more recently to seek 
growth opportunities and improve its economic situation. Ultimately, the article suggests that 
there are no cheap and easy options to foster change on the Korean peninsula, but that engaging 
the DPRK on matters of economic development at the public level might yield better results 
over time given the inflexibility of the elite.  
 
II. THE DEBATE OVER POWER 
 
1. Classical Understanding 
 In Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, Joseph Nye compares the 
concept of power to the weather, stating that everyone always talks about it yet few really fully 
understand it (2006). Power is at the core of our international system, whereby actors will seek 
to “advance particular sets of political, economic or other interests,” and “the interests that are 
favored by this arrangement reflect the relative powers of actors involved” (Gilpin 1981, 9). In 
this configuration, it is clear that just about any actor will be concerned with questions of power, 
relative or absolute. While power pertains to all actors, questions of power have centered 
around the notion of capabilities and for classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau, power 
covers anything from the physical to the psychological control of one onto another (1985). 
Power is therefore a physical capacity, and especially a military quantity that allows for the 
projection of force. With the end of the Cold War, the International Relations field has 
refocused the debate away from those “hard” capabilities to consider economic power as well. 
In this arena, Susan Strange’s work on structural power and especially the relationship between 
markets and political authority has been central (2015). Thus, power could allow anyone to 
impose their own values by designing a system that is hegemonic in nature, and that does not 
necessarily involve military capabilities (Cox 1983). What this means is that the field has 
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shifted from a traditional understanding of power as military might, one that often times 
implied the maintenance of hegemony. Instead, we can now consider a more pluralistic 
understanding of the notion of power, and one that is far from involving only coercive 
capabilities. This means that small and medium-able states do not always matter less within 
the system: while they would have, long ago, been considered unable to challenge an 
established hegemonic order because of their lack of critical military capabilities, they now are  
seen as possessing, at times, unique and useful assets too (Woehrle 1992). From education to 
culture to mediating talents, those states tout a different kind of power, one that Joseph Nye  
called “soft power” in his seminal book, Bound to Lead (1990).  
 
2. From Hard to Soft Power 
 Joseph Nye has delivered a concise definition of soft power as “the ability to affect 
others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment” 
(2008, 94). Yet, the notion of power has been visited and revisited by many prior to this 
particular iteration. While Foucault or Gramsci developed a notion of soft power based on 
structural forces, Nye proposes three prime resources that create the foundation of soft power: 
culture, political values, and foreign policies (2008, 97). When combined with the English 
language as a unifying medium within the international world, soft power becomes a vehicle 
to be shared, and for countries such as United States, results can be obtained without the use 
of coercion (Rose 2005). However, it is also easy to return to the notion that soft power could 
be used within hegemonic constructs: soft power, according to Janice Mattern, manifests itself 
via attraction, or a relationship that, while not being physical, is exercised through language, 
and could also potentially be coercive (2005).   
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Soft power studies have focused primarily on how Washington can use different 
attributes, and the field has often centered on the concept of the American way of life, how it 
is promoted through culture and products, and especially why American values are seen as 
attractive. Further political categories involving aid and ODA also allow for a more fluid and 
encompassing approach to power. This has to some extent shifted the agenda away from the 
United States onto how other states, be they small, medium, or large, manage to impose their 
ideas as well. At times, soft power can also be generated within institutions, especially those 
with a global reach. It also means that states that are often isolated or that have isolated 
themselves from the international system might be at a disadvantage when it comes to 
appearing legitimate and engaged in fostering cooperation.   
Ultimately, soft power is not about the absence of force, or more broadly an alternative 
to the usage of the military, but it is about knowing how and when to use carrots instead of 
sticks (Hackbarth 2008). This is done by creating a “medialized approach” in that soft power 
is exercised in a nexus that incorporates state foreign affairs, the media, public relations and an 
audience (Plavsak 2002). This requires two components. First, the creation of a communication 
structure, as exemplified by how the United States has been engaged, for the better part of the 
past two decades, in developing regional media hubs in the Middle East, in order to speak on 
America’s behalf (Kroenig, McAdam, and Weber 2010). Second, the development of a 
compelling strategic narrative that relies on actors, space and stage: the strategic narrative can 
clearly identify how the world is structured and who the players are, but also operates at the 
national level to clearly explain the story of a nation, its people, values and goals (Roselle, 
Miskimmon, and O'Loughlin 2014). When these elements are combined, and when they 
operate within a receptive and functioning marketplace of ideas, they help support a specific 
issues narrative that a state wants to pursue using soft power attributes. Incidentally, the choice 
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of target is crucial: soft power can be considered “high” when it targets the elite, and “low” 
when it targets the general population of a specific country (Hackbarth 2008). 
 
3. Soft Power and Public Diplomacy 
 Although soft power centers around state actors, it operates in a pluralistic environment 
that involves more than state constituents. As a result, soft power is often practiced via public 
diplomacy. Edward Murrow defined the term in 1963, while he was heading the United States 
Information Agency under President Kennedy. For Murrow, public diplomacy was about the 
interactions with foreign governments but more importantly with non-governmental actors 
such as people and institutions and organizations (Nye 2008). This often creates, at least in the 
case of public diplomacy practiced by a democracy, two spheres: “the state-to-public” sphere 
in which governments seek to explain their politics and activities to the public, and the more 
recently developed “public-to-public” sphere that involves NGOs, the media, or universities 
(Kalin 2011). Regardless of which public diplomacy sphere one focuses on, Nye stresses the 
important of maintaining regular communication explaining contexts and decisions, of 
developing a more precise strategic communication that focuses on specific themes, and of 
sustaining relationships with most of the stakeholders at hand. But in the end, soft power and 
public diplomacy do not develop overnight. They require continued engagements with the 
international environment as well as developed communication channels. 
 
III. SOFT POWER: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 
1. Refined Usage 
 While the original soft power idea is well understood in the literature, it also raises a 
number of questions that have led to a flourishing debate on the nature of actors, the messages 
delivered and received through soft power enterprises, the interplay between soft and hard 
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power, or how to simply measure an actors’ soft power potential. A number of private agencies 
have been busy producing soft power rankings, and Portland Communications, with a foreword 
from Joseph Nye, uses culture, food, sport, as well as political concepts such as governance 
and more recently digital diplomacy as variables to provide a top-thirty ranking. The 2015 
results featured the United Kingdom as leading the pack, swiftly followed by Germany, the 
United States, France and Canada. China closes the ranks at the 30th place  (McClory 2015) . 
Just as any other enterprise that seeks to put a value on the nature of power, much of the 
scholarship has focused on tools and resources and their derived and projected capabilities. 
This means that the study of soft power is often focused on counting beans instead of clearly 
analyzing processes through which soft power really operates. This is especially true when it 
comes to looking at the concept of soft power beyond the perimeter of its most talked-about 
user, the United States. Just as scholarship and analysis of capabilities often revolve around 
how great powers yield their resources, the study of soft power has only started to scratch the 
surface, and considers how smaller, and in some cases even states that have been labelled rogue 
states, might also be using soft power means to sustain and develop themselves. Hence, the 
concept of soft power has gained considerable traction because it allows for the participation 
of a broad amount of actors within the system as well as the opportunity to make progress, 
without necessary spending too much because citizens do not need to go to war: the cost of 
entering into soft power activities is therefore cheaper than engaging with hard power (Mattern 
2005). A practical example often revolves around data and book exchanges, or sometimes 
termed “high culture,” which is seen as a low-cost and easy approach to foster profound change 
within a particular society, as was demonstrated by a few initiatives via the Asia Foundation in 
North Korea (Park and Bennett 2014). The concept also allows for actors to transcend their 
limitations: states such a South Korea or South Africa would be unable to become regional 
powers because of the interplay between complex historical legacies and geographical and 
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resource limitations, yet through international branding, they are able to maximize their 
economic gains (Kalinowski and Cho 2012). Ultimately though, what matters is using power 
smartly. Ernest Wilson reunifies various strands of power, especially the hard and soft varieties, 
by defining smart power as “the capacity of an actor to combine elements of hard power and 
soft power in ways that are mutually reinforcing such that the actor’s purposes are advanced 
effectively and efficiently” (2008, 110). It then becomes imperative to consider more refined 
interpretations of soft power, and especially interpretations that depart from the view that all 
usage of soft power is “positive” and for the greater good, peace and harmony (Loh 2017). 
Recent works that consider soft power as defensive power, soft power as image shifting and 
soft power as niche diplomacy represent new articulations particularly helpful to the study of 
the North Korean case.  
 
2. Harder Ways to Consider Soft Power? Soft Balancing and Defensive Soft Power 
 What becomes of soft power when an actor’s purpose is, at its core, about survival and 
how to maintain a specific status within the system? For the People’s Republic of China, the 
concept of soft power has been about pursuing hegemony. Some have suggested that this 
hegemonic quest is benign, and it articulated along the “smile diplomacy,” or “good neighbor 
diplomacy”  with hosting the Olympic Games often cited as an important step for China (Finlay 
and Xin 2010). Others have concentrated on China’s new role as a donor country, providing 
development aid, although a case could be made that this is an economic venture to develop 
relationships rather than an altruistic journey (Hsiao 2009). It is the Confucius Institutes system, 
however that has often embodied China’s quest to spread its soft power and appeal to an 
international audience that is interested in culture and education, one of the core soft power 
resources highlighted by Joseph Nye. But when writing about the then-novel phenomena of 
the Confucius Institutes, whose numbers have now passed 100 around the world, James 
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Paradise suggested that the enterprise was as much about disseminating information about 
China to improve its image abroad than it was a political design (2009). For one, Confucius 
Institutes have created tensions when being created in international settings as they adhere to 
Chinese laws, a point that is sticky when it comes to academic freedom and the potential 
interference of Chinese officials into academic affairs of a foreign country (Callahan 2015). 
The notion of soft power within the Chinese context is, indeed, somewhat different from what 
is usually accepted within the Western sphere, as it incorporates the concept of subduing an 
enemy without having to fight (Wang and Lu 2008). So, some have suggested that China is 
using soft power in a defensive manner by making a conscious effort to engage with and refute 
attacks made on China’s image, while at the same time ensuring that the press also runs 
“ambivalent” articles about China so as to give the impression that the coverage is balanced 
(Loh 2017). China has also been seen as yielding “negative” soft power: instead of using soft 
power as a foreign policy tool, Beijing is actually more concerned about domestic policies and 
regime legitimacy (Callahan 2015). This means that the Chinese soft power enterprise becomes 
about the development of a narrative about China and how it operates in the world, with the 
goal to unifying and crystalizing the PRC as one country (Finlay and Xin 2010). This does 
make sense given the contentious relationship between mainland China and Taiwan. Taiwan 
has a different interpretation of soft power, one rooted in political institutions and diplomacy 
as opposed to Beijing’s view that Chinese soft power rests on traditional Chinese culture (Wang 
and Lu 2008). Russia is in a similar situation when it comes to using soft power to re-establish 
its lead over the former Soviet region: Moscow might be exercising soft power as a form of 
imperialism (Tsyganov 2006). Both China and Russia have also been engaged, at times, in soft 
balancing against one particular state, the United States. Other states such as Venezuela have 
also engaged in similar activities, with a clear policy under Hugo Chavez to develop relations 
and alliances with Cuba or Iran, and organize anti-US summits (Corrales 2009).  Eventually, 
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the United States has to use soft power to counterbalance a number of threats and conflicts: 
musical diplomacy has been used to induce a change in the US-DPRK relationship (Cathcart 
2009) while more recent efforts have focused on the Middle East and changing how Iraqis 
perceive Washington in order to assuage the US-led Iraqi occupation (Kroenig, McAdam, and 
Weber 2010).  
 
3. Smarter Ways to Consider Soft Power?  Virtual Enlargement and Shifting Image 
 Some nations such as India have naturally capitalized on innate soft power values such 
as non-violence or democracy (Wagner 2010). Soft power has also been used in the context of 
changing one’s image from one that might have been problematic in the past to a new one that 
is deemed more seductive, more attractive, and in some cases less threatening. France created 
the Alliance Française in 1883 as a way to project French culture at a time when the French 
government had just suffered a defeat in the Franco-Prussian war and needed to reestablish its 
relationship and image (Nye 2008, 96). The question of shifting image is often very much tied 
to the environment and history, and states have had to rewrite a specific narrative in order to 
reframe their own history and place within a particular system. Hence, Iran’s usage of soft 
power has changed over time, from focusing on its civilization and heritage prior to the 1979 
Revolution to be overtly about Islam, with Ayatollah Khomeini’s “neither East nor West but 
Islamic Republic” slogan (Wastnidge 2015). Qatar, too, is currently attempting to dispel 
potential negative views of the Middle East and especially the notion of instability in the region 
by hosting the Soccer World Cup (Grix and Brannagan 2016). Japan, as a reformed colonial 
power is also attempting to promote a soft power image via the popular Japan Exchange and 
Teaching Program (JET), the increasing use of Overseas Development Assistance or the usage 
of manga and anime. It has done so to propagate the idea of “Japan Cool” but also to reframe 
its usage of the military:  anime characters have been painted on some of the non-combat troops 
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military equipment Japan has used in Iraq (Lam 2007). Yet, this promotion attempts to mitigate 
Japan’s image and other political actions related to history, such as the difficulty to negotiate 
around the question of comfort women, for example. In this particular context, Japan also 
competes on the soft power plane with other countries such as South Korea, which has 
replicated a similar strategy to Japan with the will to brand South Korea and the development 
of manhwas, or hallyu as federating cultural forces in Asia and beyond. Given that Seoul was 
a victim of Japanese colonialism, it has a definite advantage since it does not have to fight 
against the remnant of the image of an aggressor. But propagating soft power through a 
particular national image can also be problematic if other countries find this particular 
offensive: anti-China sentiments have been noted in Japanese mangas by the Chinese press 
(Lam 2007). Because soft power relies heavily on proper communication channels and 
cultivating a receptive audience, it is key not to alienate others: Hugo Chavez’ social power 
engagement, and especially his will to polarize opinion, was seen as problematic for potential 
clients who wanted to not just be rhetorically involved with one another (Corrales 2009). Thus, 
the “negative” side of soft power has not always been analyzed. But just like any policy, the 
soft power approach is not just a benign tool and the advent of communication techniques 
online means that it is now very difficult to hide a public protest or a political backlash against 
prying electronic eyes (Loh 2017).  
 
4. Unique Ways to Consider Soft Power? Niche and Growth Diplomacy  
Branding as part of a niche diplomacy is also becoming an increasingly diversified way 
to engage in soft power activities. South Korea has made significant effort to create a specific 
branding to engage with the international community and to cement its position as a middle 
power with clout within the system. It has been argued that developing a brand goes beyond 
consumerism, and must engage with societal values as well (Cull 2012). However, there is a 
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healthy dose of skepticism surrounding the ROK’s branding strategy as this strategy is seen as 
overtly mercantilist (Kalinowski and Cho 2012). In this light, Seoul’s strategy is much less 
about spreading values than it is about securing a number of Free Trade Agreements and 
providing Overseas Development Assistance to enhance its standing. Seoul has also been seen 
as stepping up its notion of sovereignty and territorial integrity by engaging in border tourism: 
this is clearly represented through Seoul’s development of the Demilitarized Zone, as well as 
the narrative it has built around the Dokdo islands. Ultimately, there is a sense that the Republic 
of Korea is still fighting the ghost of Japanese power and invasion, while simultaneously being 
engaged in a war of division over the peninsula given the unresolved nature of the Korean 
conflict. So, nations must often be able to carve themselves a specific niche within the 
diplomatic world if they want to exert soft power; for this particular aspect, development is a 
popular field. Brazil, for example, has engaged in solidarity development cooperation, and 
evidence has shown that a more positive image of Brazil amongst aid recipients has formed 
not on the basis of what has been achieved via the project but more on how the management 
and relationship between entities and individuals were developed and sustained (Bry 2015). 
The development of a style, of a presence and of a voice is also what Norway has been recently 
cultivating. For a small state of only 5 million people, and a speaker of a different language 
than English, it has managed to present an image to the world that it is a peaceful force to be 
reckoned with (Nye 2008). Lastly, Cuba is another atypical player that has flirted with isolation 
and conflict with the United States, and has often touted its soft power approach with its 
worldwide exports of Cuban doctors and nurses (Corrales 2009).    
 
 
IV. NORTH KOREA’S SOFT POWER CONTEXT 
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The question of power has always surrounded the Korean peninsula, but never fully on 
the DPRK beyond its nuclear and missile proliferation. A survey of the literature shows intense 
engagement in analyzing how the DPRK has slowly build a rocky albeit still surviving socialist 
system (Gills 1992, Chun 1984, Kihl and Kim 2006). There is also an important focus on the 
concept of potential reunification (Bleiker 2005, Harrison 2003, Armstrong 2005). However, 
most scholarship has focused on the security dilemma surrounding the Korean peninsula 
because North Korea was seen for many years as being on the brink of collapse (Bennett 2013, 
Oh and Hassig 1999). The past two decades have seen an extraordinary amount of work done 
on North Korea’s hard security matters, and by association on how the United States and Asian 
regional powers can contend with North Korea’s missile development as well as its nuclear 
weapons program (Albright and Hinderstein 2006, Van Ness 2003, Sigal 1999, Kwak 2010). 
In all these discussions, the will of the DPRK has often been left aside, and North Korea treated 
as an object within this particular security dilemma, a problem to be tackled and solved, with 
the immutable belief that the state of Korean affairs should return to a pre-division era, and 
with North Korea’s system and survival being described as an anomaly in our international 
system. It is only recently that a more critical reading of Korean affairs has entertained the idea 
that the DPRK was not nearly as irrational as previously depicted, and not nearly as on the 
brink of collapse as it might have been in the 1990s (Smith 2000, Byman and Lind 2010, Frank 
2012). In the end, hard power has been discussed, but soft power only marginally considered 
in the context of the DPRK as being the target of soft power efforts, for it was not quite 
conceivable that an alienated, rogue and violent regime might have the means and the will to 
consider using soft power in any way, shape or form.  
 
1. The DPRK and Soft Power: A Conventional Story 
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 The DPRK’s relationship with soft power is mostly depicted along Nye’s lines: it is 
about how to use culture and attributes in places where it might be attractive to others, political 
values at home or abroad, and foreign policies that might be seen as having moral authority. 
Within these perimeters, soft power initiatives in the DPRK have centered on a few events that 
have been held as examples of success, and often heralded as processes that should be 
reproduced, and that would eventually become agents of change within the DPRK society. 
Foreign policy soft power initiatives separate from the government have not featured at all 
since just about any activity initiated by foreign powers on North Korean territory is subject to 
political scrutiny and would have most likely been stopped.  
Activities involving political values have taken place during the 2000 meeting between 
Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Il, and the initiative to organize family reunions for those who 
had been separated many years before by the Korean partition and the Korean War.1 Soft power 
used in a cultural context has been more visible: the opening in 2004 of the Goethe Institute 
reading room in Pyongyang, 2  the 2008 New York Philharmonic Orchestra concert in 
Pyongyang, and the visit in 2013 of basketball player Dennis Rodman and his meeting with 
Kim Jong Un are the more prominent examples.3 All those initiatives vary in their messages, 
but they also all share a similar element as they have been targeted at the two levels described 
by James Hackbarth (2008): low-level targeting with the Korean people, and high-level 
targeting with the Korean elite. They have, in both cases, represented effort at socialization, a 
process by which the “other side” can slowly be known and potentially understood (Saunders 
1991). The seemingly brotherly connection that was shown with Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong 
Il’s historic hug and handshake in 2000 was important for the Korean people as a whole. The 
Philharmonic concert broadcasted in the DPRK humanized Americans and North Koreas to 
one another, and connected them while playing music that could apparently be enjoyed by both 
parties, despite the fact that some music choices might also have provided for a hidden and 
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subversive meaning, at least on the American part (Cathcart 2009). The basketball meet 
performed a similar function, and proceeded, for a moment, to humanize Kim Jong Un as a 
person enjoying a simple game: the message was also important to the rest of the world, 
suggesting that if a connection could be made around a simple ball, then surely the rift between 
the DPRK and the United States could not be that deep. Suffice is to say that in light of the 
more recent rounds of nuclear testing, basketball diplomacy has failed to gain many 3-pointers.  
The Goethe Institute initiative was part of a project that dovetailed with high-culture 
and education partnerships, a strand of engagement that has become more sustained and visible 
in the DPRK over the past decade. But back in 2004, the Goethe Institute was the first Western 
reading room in Pyongyang. The DPRK and Germany negotiated book content, censorship was 
not permitted, and access to resources had to be granted to anyone in North Korea.4 The 
Institute closed in 2009 after the DPRK failed to provide internet access and allow unrestrained 
access to the population: the culture aspect of the collection, which was embodied in a number 
of literature and music books, was of little interest to a North Korean elite that wanted more 
technology, science, and medical resources.5 This simple fact shows that the DPRK is most 
likely less interested in variety and novelty as it is interested in specific technical resources: a 
strategy player concerned with its survival, the DPRK is known not to trample upon its red line, 
and to pull out of a deal if it becomes unsatisfactory and high risk to the survival of its elite 
(Snyder 1999).  
What is clear is that these initiatives did not provide a catalyst for further change, and 
especially for the resolution of complex hard-power dilemmas. The assumption that soft power 
is unsuccessful when used “against” the DPRK is perhaps the most problematic point here: in 
Western minds, the success of such initiatives would end with the Kim family downfall and 
essentially the collapse of the North Korean government, leaving the population to be absorbed 
by the South. This is a strategic narrative that has been cultivated for many decades by the 
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United States and its allies, first within the context of the Cold War and the fight against 
Communist ideas, and then within the context of North Korea’s illicit nuclear weapons program. 
The problem is that strategic narratives run both ways: the DPRK is an expert and master at 
soft power (with a hefty dose of policing as well) in its domestic context, where a strategic 
narrative about survival, about enemies, and about how the DPRK leaders are the only hope to 
provide guidance for the country to survive and thrive has been developed for many years and 
coerce an entire population. These strategic narratives include political values, foreign policy 
goals and strong cultural elements. This brings us back to the concept of defensive soft power, 
and especially how North Korea operates similarly to China, which has been using elements of 
soft power to ensure national cohesion (Loh 2017). This also means that while the DPRK 
controls its soft power technique, it is more knowledgeable about the potential impact of 
foreign initiatives that bring soft power to a number of cultural and educational areas. Though 
the hierarchical and top-down nature of the North Korean regime might suggests that the DPRK 
does not necessarily know the difference between organizations, NGOs, private-citizens and 
state-sponsored educational enterprises, this thesis has been refuted (Zhebin 1995): the DPRK 
has always interacted with a number of actors since the Cold War, it has also joined 28 
intergovernmental institutions and has experienced varied engagements with the NGO sector 
during the 1990s with the World Food Program, and a number of projects funded by the 
European Union (Ślusarczyk 2010).  
 Thus, the main puzzle remains about what soft power initiatives could potentially foster 
change and modernization in the DPRK, but within the perimeter of the Kim family retaining 
their hold on power. Knowledge-sharing approaches in the fields of food security, public health, 
medicine or agriculture, but also business and international law might provide the start of an 
answer (Park and Bennett 2014). Initiatives by Syracuse University a decade ago have been 
followed by new schemes by Singapore-based Choson Exchange to teach business, in the 
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DPRK, to citizens and in some cases exclusively to women, while Canada’s University of 
British Colombia has hosted North Korean university professors for extended periods. PUST, 
Pyongyang University of Sciences and Technology which was launched in 2010 is the first 
private and foreign university to operate in the DPRK.6 But in all these cases, the DPRK is still 
a recipient of soft power. Yet, a reading of contemporary North Korea within the context of 
how soft power is created provides alternatives: under such a lens, Pyongyang’s structures and 
policies could be those of a soft-power emitter itself. 
 
2. Reframing Soft Power beyond the Mundane 
 While there is a general assumption that small and poorer nations are unable to really 
contribute to the international system and its management (Chasek 2005), it has also been 
argued that small states, because of their particular historical contexts, decision-making 
processes and general negotiation behavior, might have considerable clout within the 
international system after all (Zhu 2007). Marrying these arguments to how soft power is 
defined allows for looking at the DPRK under a new lens: possessing soft power and being 
able to administer it means that military and hard capacities matter less than previously thought 
(Melissen 2005). The DPRK, because of its weapons development, already possesses what is, 
in the end, a Joker card in the form of a nuclear deterrent. Nuclear weapons also involve the 
concept of prestige, at least for poorer nations that look at the North Korean example and 
imagine it as representing success. If Janice Mattern talks about the importance of attraction in 
yielding soft power (2005), then the DPRK might be able to provide a narrative that is attractive 
to lesser powers;  it might have succeeded in developing what Lynne Woehrle called “unique 
and useful assets” (1992).  In this case, this means nuclear weapons and a capacity to keep the 
superpower United States at bay, and thus tapping into the anti-hegemony movement. 
Venezuela’s own actions in developing relations with Cuba and Iran, and also organizing anti-
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United States summits, show the world that it might be possible to engage in offensives that 
are delivered via soft power initiatives. We also know that soft power can change over time, 
and be based on different attributes. Iran prior to the Islamic Revolution based its soft power 
on its civilization and heritage, while the Revolution led to a stronger focus on Islam and a will 
to remain neither part of the East not the West (Wastnidge 2015). This construct is similar to 
the DPRK’s decision to play the PRC and the USSR against one another in the 1960s, while it 
developed its own narrative based on independence and non-interference. 
More importantly, the DPRK fits snuggly into Kristina Plavsak’s “medialized” 
approach as well, whereby a state needs to operate within a nexus that connects its foreign 
affairs to the media and eventually to an audience (2002). Here, the DPRK has developed since 
1946 and the creation of its state-own media Korean Central News Agency an outlet that 
communicates the Workers’ Party of Korea’s views to a wider audience, along with the 
leadership’s views. Considering the DPRK as a potential source of soft power means that any 
ventures will most likely be initiated by the state and thus the elite, and will fall within the 
state-to public realm of action, which is described by Ibrahim Kalin as the sphere in which 
governments attempts to explain their activities and politics to the foreign public and audience 
to gain power and influence (2011). When looking at the KCNA, a foreign-focused media 
enterprise, and how it communicates about the world, several categories appear: a spectrum 
extends from closeness with countries such as China, to antagonism with the United States and 
Japan. A content analysis of the KCNA’s data, available from 1997 to 2015, for 192 states, 
shows that the DPRK, via the KCNA, consistently talks about a large number of countries, but 
more importantly it also engages with domestic actors that are not always official governments 
such as political groups, education enterprises, culture entities, and in some cases private 
citizens. Only a few dozen countries never appear in the DPRK’s media frame. For the others, 
there are various and gradual engagement modes: 
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- “Greetings, Congratulations and Condolences” whereby the KCNA is used as a 
diplomatic tool to send congratulations to countries and people to celebrate their 
national holidays, leaders’ elections, independence anniversaries as well as 
commiserate on deaths and disasters. 
- “Hope for Relations,” a “back-burner” category used by the DPRK to suggest that 
relationships could develop further, perhaps past the point of greetings and 
congratulations to reach a delegation exchange state. 
- “Delegations” where the DPRK expands on diplomatic engagement, and 
delegations are sent and received. 
- “Protocols and Agreements” whereby the DPRK presents cooperation enterprises, 
especially in the fields of culture, technology and education.  
- “Memorandum of Understanding and Defense Agreements” usually falling along 
close historical partnerships. 
However, if the DPRK appears to possess the nexus to spread soft power, it does not 
mean that it is able to attract others and compel them to do what is wants. Indeed, the DPRK 
has a strategic narrative that has been developed around its quest for survival, the Chuch’e 
ideology and more recently its commitment to its economic independence and sovereignty in 
a world that is globalized and capitalized. Yet, this strategic narrative is hampered by North 
Korea’s military development, its nuclear tests and the nature of its regime. Finding the right 
target audience in a functioning marketplace of ideas (Kroenig, McAdam, and Weber 2010) 
for a strategic narrative developed in these conditions and by this specific actor remains a 
challenge.  
 
V. CONCLUSIONS: NORTH KOREA’S SMART POWER GAME? 
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 Defensive soft power, image management and enlargement and growth/niche 
diplomacy represent the three broad soft power enterprises with which the DPRK has been 
engaged. Because of the DPRK’s Kim leadership, the human rights abuses, general instability 
and irrationality associated with the Korean peninsula and North Korea, there are serious 
limitations to the soft power capacities that the DPRK can produce, and can broadcast. As Alan 
Chong puts it, small isolated states such as Sierra Leone, Fiji, Cuba or even North Korea would 
need to develop their economy and social capital exponentially if they wanted to virtually 
enlarge their presence the way Singapore has managed to, for example (2010). For 
authoritarian states such as the DPRK or Iran, Joseph Nye’s soft power model is used upside 
down: while soft power is usually a bottom-up enterprise led at the grass-root levels by non-
state actors, soft power for Pyongyang or Tehran starts at the top and trickles down lower, and 
the message is established by the leaders, and propagated through the media (the KCNA for 
North Korea, or the Islamic Republic’s international media outlets for Iran), before the message 
is nurtured at times on foreign grounds by outreach centers (Wastnidge 2015). For states such 
as North Korea, non-state actors abroad can at times disseminate ideas. This is the case for 
Chuch’e study groups, national chapters of Korea Friendship Associations, and far left-wing 
groups with connections to Pyongyang that are particularly active in Spain, Italy, and Poland.7 
Defensive soft power is a prominent feature for the DPRK. It is articulated, at times, 
via the DPRK’s engagement in global governance. North Korea’s participation in a number of 
international organizations has often been utilized to defend the DPRK’s right to exist, usually 
in defiance of the ROK. This has been the case within the UNESCO, where the DPRK has 
promoted a successful bid to list a number of ancient tombs and Koguryo murals to the status 
of World Heritage sites,8 including its own version of the traditional song Arirang.9  But the 
real North Korean soft power weapons is articulated via the KCNA. The KCNA communicates 
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in ways that is similar to Dylan Loh’s China own defensive soft power techniques (2017): 
“fact-like news reporting” that essentially promote the DPRK’s image and address criticisms 
of its system from other countries and actors, and other articles that project a positive image of 
the DPRK via projects and engagements. While the former is usually well-known and labelled 
as North Korean propaganda, the latter are broad in scope as they focus on education, culture, 
the arts and technology, and involve partners that are not always traditional (i.e not only former 
USSR satellites or the PRC). These include: 
- November 2008: Agreement on cultural cooperation between DPRK and Qatar 
- December 2008: Cooperation agreement between DPRK and Czech Republic 
- March 2010: Signature of cultural cooperation agreement between DPRK and 
Gabon 
- March 2010: Signature of plan for cultural cooperation agreement between DPRK 
and India 
- November 2010: Signature of inter-government pan for culture between DPRK and 
Indonesia 
- March 2012: Unhasu Orchestra gives performance in Paris 
- April 2012: Signature of 2012-2014 plan for cultural exchange between DPRK and 
Vietnam 
- April 2012: Education Partnership with Canada 
- April 2012: Performance of Ukrainian Dance Troupe in Pyongyang 
- April 2012: Joint internet homepage opens in Kuwait 
- May 2012: Korea-Norway joint concert in Pyongyang 
- September 2012: Joint scientific conference opens 
- November 2012: Joint DPRK-German concert 
- November 2013: Working pan for cultural cooperation between DPRK and Egypt 
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- May 2014: Cultural exchange plan signed between DPRK and Bangladesh 
- July 2014: Plan for cultural exchange signed between DPRK and Cambodia 
Improving and enlarging one’s image is the second important theme for the DPRK in 
its usage of soft power. This image shifting has been done through a retooling of some of its 
own capabilities, as well as the promotion of its own country, architecture, and assets as 
vehicles for power. The capability of retooling pertains to the role of the military, as mentioned 
by Haluk Karadag, and means that forces could be seen as public agency and no longer just a 
tool of oppression (2017). The DPRK has been involved in police, taekwondo and military 
training for a number of years, especially in Uganda where cooperation in the field has been 
ongoing for more than three decades,10 though it has recently come under scrutiny by the 
United Nations as part of sanctions that prohibit military training.11 The promotion of the 
DPRK’s own natural beauty and facilities has started to become more visible. While the KCNA 
often calls for foreign investments to support the development of tourist industries, the 
domestic tourism industry developed in partnership with a number of foreign organizations has 
meant that a sizable number of foreigners have visited the DPRK. Tours take place around the 
DPRK’s important events such as Kim Il Sung’s birthday, or the Pyongyang marathon. The 
financial incentive is important for the DPRK as allowing foreigners in means that foreign 
currencies can be raised directly (American dollars, Chinese Yuan and Euros are routinely 
accepted in the DPRK). However, the DPRK has also been projecting its image abroad via 
food. The establishment in Europe of the Pyongyang Restaurant, a joint venture between two 
Dutch Businessman and North Korea opened in Amsterdam in 201212 and there are similar 
ventures located in China, though the 2016 group staff defection from a Beijing North Korean 
restaurant brings us once again back to the nature of the North Korean regime and the difficulty 
it has to blur the reality of its citizens’ treatment.13 
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Niche diplomacy and especially promoting growth and to some extent pleasure and 
happiness abroad is an unusual proposition when associated with the DPRK, but represents a 
developing area for Pyongyang. The DPRK soft power is seen, yet to some extent hidden in its 
architecture abroad, and especially in Africa where the Mansudae overseas division, an 
offshoot of the Mansudae Arts Studio which build monuments, fresco and other art pieces to 
support the DPRK’s propaganda domestically has been particularly active in building large 
museums, memorials, statues, and state houses. The art has a distinct North Korean feel, and 
has made North Korea a popular choice for historic monuments, especially because of their 
relatively cost-effective value.14 The DPRK has also used its museum know-how and has 
assisted the Tanzanian military building in Dar es Salaam in 2008 with art displays.15 The latest 
North Korean museum venture is available in Cambodia, at the Angkor Wat temple site where 
tourists can visit the Panorama museum, which houses an animated 360-degree fresco 
representing life during the Khmer empire. 16 The revolving viewing platform is a copy of the 
platform showing a fresco of the Korean War at the National Liberation Museum in Pyongyang. 
While it is not possible to know the full intention behind the DPRK’s engagement with such 
monuments and trade, it appears that the power connection factors very little. For Pyongyang, 
the monuments represent an interesting cash flow and the Panorama museum is expected to 
provide a steady income stream of about $150,000 to the DPRK through ticket sales alone.17 
With United Nations Security Council Resolution 2321 adopted in late 2016, the future of 
North Korean statue and monument exports might be compromised, since they are now 
outlawed by the resolution.18 Yet, there is still some mileage in North Korea’s soft power 
efforts. A decade ago, North Korea followed the Cuban medical personnel example efforts by 
signing a deal with Zimbabwe. Under the agreement, North Korean doctors would staff 
hospitals to mitigate the effect of the brain drain that has seen doctors seek better job in South 
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Africa or in the United Kingdom.19 More recently, the DPRK has exported ginseng and the 
practice of acupuncture to Mexico.20  
While it is difficult to fully embrace the notion that the DPRK is an exporter of soft 
power given the fact that its political values and attractiveness to others is quite limited, the 
relationship between Pyongyang and soft power is a two-way street. Evidence shows limited 
support for the notion that soft power can radically be exported to one country or onto one actor 
and change its behavior. To this extent, even military power often fails to achieve such a feat. 
But there are many shades to the notion of soft power, and to the reasons why specific countries 
might engage in public diplomacy. Soft power can have an impact in North Korea when taking 
the form of high culture and education, but with the understanding that the North Korean 
government still mans the boat, and controls its population through a tight police system and a 
strategic narrative that leaves little leeway to radical change from the bottom-up. With 
economic indicators showing a slow economic upturn in the DPRK despite many sanctions,21 
the focus of soft power applied to the DPRK should be about supporting its modernization to 
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